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ABSTRACT
Are subjective well-being (SWB) measures a good empirical proxy for utility? We evaluate one necessary
assumption: that people’s preferences coincide with what they predict will maximize their SWB. Our
method is to present survey respondents with hypothetical scenarios and elicit both choice and predicted
SWB rankings of two alternatives. While choice and predicted SWB rankings usually coincide, we
find systematic reversals. Furthermore, we identify factors—such as predicted sense of purpose, control
over one‘s life, family happiness, and social status—that help explain choice controlling for predicted
























An online appendix is available at:
http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w16489  2 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 
Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are 
very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy? 
Much of the time during the past week, you felt you were happy. Would you say yes or no?
1 
 
Economists increasingly use survey-based measures of subjective well-being (SWB) as 
an empirical proxy for utility. In some applications, SWB data are used for conducting welfare 
evaluations that are difficult to conduct with standard revealed preference methods. Examples 
include measuring the negative externality from neighbors‘ higher earnings (Luttmer, 2005), 
individuals‘ tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald, 
2003), and the effect of health status on the marginal utility of consumption (Finkelstein, 
Luttmer, and Notowidigdo, 2008). In order for such SWB-based evaluations to assess welfare as 
conceived in the standard economic approach, a necessary assumption is that an agent‘s 
preferences over alternatives and her measured SWB under each alternative yield identical 
rankings of the alternatives. This paper provides evidence for evaluating that assumption. Put 
differently but equivalently, the goal of this paper is to assess whether individuals seek to 
maximize SWB (as commonly measured). 
In pursuing that goal, this paper also empirically addresses two opposing theoretical 
views regarding the relationship between SWB and utility. The first, reflected at least implicitly 
in a large number of papers (e.g., Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005; Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer, 
2008; Welsch, 2009), is that SWB data represent idealized revealed-preference utility in the 
sense of what individuals would choose if they were well-informed about the consequences of 
their choices for SWB. The second view, explicitly laid out in Kimball and Willis (2006) and 
Becker and Rayo (2008), is that even well-informed agents will be willing to trade off SWB for 
other things they care about, making SWB and utility distinct.
2 This paper assesses these two 
                                                 
1 The first of these three questions is from the World Values Survey (WVS); similar questions appear in the Euro-
Barometer Survey, the European Social Survey, the German Socioeconomic Panel (G-SOEP), and the Japanese Life 
in Nation survey. The second question is from the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS); similar questions appear in the 
Euro-Barometer survey, the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), and the WVS. The third question 
is from the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers; similar questions appear in the Center of Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being 
Index (GHWBI). 
2 For other elaborations of this view, see also Kimball, Levy, Ohtake and Tsutsui (2006), Tsutsui, Kimball, and 
Ohtake (2010), and Kimball, Nunn and Silverman (2010).   3 
views empirically by measuring the concordance between choices and what individuals think 
will maximize their SWB.
3 
We pose a variety of hypothetical decision scenarios to three respondent populations: a 
convenience sample of 1,066 adults, a representative sample of 1,000 adult Americans, and 633 
students. Each scenario has two alternatives. For example, one scenario describes a choice 
between a job that pays less but allows more sleep versus a job with higher pay and less sleep. 
We ask respondents which alternative they would choose. We also ask them under which 
alternative they expect greater SWB; we assess this ―predicted SWB‖ using measures based on 
each of the three commonly-used SWB questions posed in the epigraph above. Importantly, 
since people often mispredict the happiness consequences of their choices (e.g., Gilbert, 2006), 
we compare an individual’s choices with her ex ante beliefs regarding her choices’ effects on 
SWB.
4  
We have two main results. First, we find that overall, respondents‘ SWB predictions are a 
powerful predictor of their choices. On average, predicted SWB and choice coincide in our data 
83 percent of the time. We find that the strength of this relationship varies across choice 
situations, subject populations, survey methods, questionnaire structure variations, and measures 
of SWB, with coincidence ranging from well below 50 percent to above 95 percent.     
Our second main result is that discrepancies between choice and predicted SWB rankings 
are systematic. Moreover, we can identify other, non-SWB factors that help explain respondents‘ 
choices. In some surveys, in addition to measuring participants‘ choices and predicted SWB, we 
also ask participants to predict how each alternative would affect particular aspects of life other 
than SWB. The aspects that systematically contribute most to explaining choice, controlling for 
SWB, are sense of purpose, control over life, family happiness, and social status. At the same 
time, and in line with our first main result above, when we examine how well SWB compares 
with the other factors we measure, we find that across our scenarios, populations, and methods, 
                                                 
3  Some  researchers  adopt  yet  a  third  view,  the  philosophical  position  that  happiness  per  se  is  the  appropriate 
maximand for a policymaker (e.g., Bentham, 1789; Layard, 2005; Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, forthcoming). 
See  Bernheim  (2009)  for  a  categorization  and  discussion  of  alternative  philosophical  approaches  to  welfare 
economics.  Throughout  this  paper,  we  adopt  the  standard  economic  perspective  (common  to  the  two  views 
mentioned in the text) that the appropriate maximand for welfare analysis is an individual’s preferences. However, 
the value of our results does not hinge on this perspective. Even if one believes that happiness is the appropriate 
maximand, one would like to know under what circumstances people choose to maximize it on their own, and under 
what circumstances a policymaker would have to intervene in order to maximize it. 
4 In the terminology of Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997), we compare ―decision utility‖ (what people choose) 
with ―predicted utility‖ (what people predict will make them happier).   4 
SWB is by far the single best predictor of choice. 
These results provide a nuanced answer to our motivating question. People do not 
exclusively seek to maximize SWB (as operationalized by common SWB measures), yet SWB 
does seem to be a uniquely important argument in the utility function. Furthermore, as discussed 
shortly, the choice-SWB relationship varies systematically with scenario and SWB measure.  
We use a variety of survey versions and empirical approaches in order to test the 
robustness of our main results to alternative interpretations. For example, while most of our data 
are gathered by eliciting both choice and predicted SWB rankings from each respondent, in some 
of our survey variations we elicit the two rankings far apart in the survey, or we elicit only 
choice ranking from some participants and only SWB ranking from others. To take another 
example, we assess the impact of measurement error by administering the same survey twice (at 
two separate times) to some of our respondents. While these different approaches affect our point 
estimates and hence the relative importance of our two main results, both results appear to be 
robust.  
As steps toward providing practical, measure-specific and situation-specific guidance to 
empirical researchers as to when the assumption that people try to maximize predicted SWB is a 
better or worse approximation, we analyze how our results differ across SWB measures and 
across scenarios. Comparing SWB measures, we find that a ―life satisfaction‖ measure (modeled 
after the first question in the epigraph) is a better predictor of choice than either of two 
―happiness‖ measures (modeled after the second and third questions in the epigraph) which 
perform similarly to each other. Comparing scenarios, we find that in scenarios constructed to 
resemble what our student respondents judge as representative of important decisions in their 
lives, predicted SWB coincides least often with choice, and other factors add relatively more 
explanatory power. This suggests that caution is especially warranted in drawing welfare 
conclusions from SWB data in such situations. Importantly, we also find that in scenarios where 
one alternative offers more money, respondents are systematically more likely to choose the 
money alternative than they are likely to predict it will yield higher SWB. This suggests that 
survey-based SWB measures may understate the utility benefits of higher income.  
Our work is related to a literature in philosophy that poses thought experiments in 
hypothetical scenarios in order to demonstrate that people‘s preferences encompass more than 
their own happiness. That literature focuses on extreme situations such as being hooked up to a   5 
machine that guarantees happiness.
5 In contrast, by focusing on realistic choice situations rather 
than on extreme ones, and by focusing on commonly-used SWB measures rather than on the 
concept of happiness, we seek to assess to what extent measured happiness is a good proxy for 
preferences in empirically-relevant situations.
6 As far as we are aware, the work whose 
methodology is most similar to ours is one of the experiments in Tversky and Griffin (1991), but 
their research question is different.
7  
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the survey design and subject 
populations. Section II asks whether participants choose the alternative in our decision scenarios 
that they predict will generate greater SWB. Section III asks whether aspects of life other than 
SWB help predict choice, controlling for SWB, and compares the relative predictive power of 
the factors that matter for choice. Section IV presents robustness analyses. Section V discusses 
additional results. Section VI concludes, and discusses other possible applications of our 
methodology. Finally, the Appendix lists our decision scenarios, and the Web Appendix provides 
a chronology of all pilots; details information on all survey instruments; describes all of our 
robustness analyses and reports all the resulting tables; and reports an extensive set of additional 
analyses and results. 
   
                                                 
5 In what is perhaps the most famous thought experiment, a reader is asked to introspect whether he or she would 
choose to be hooked up to an ―experience machine‖ that would guarantee complete happiness for the rest of life, 
without awareness that the experience is not real (Nozick, 1974, pp.42-45). It is argued that if a reader would refuse 
the  machine,  he  or  she  must  not  care  exclusively  about  happiness.  Less  fancifully,  extreme  examples  such  as 
sacrificing one’s life for a cause one believes in may also suggest that happiness is not the only maximand. 
6  Like  us,  Becker  and  Rayo  (2008)  propose  empirical  tests  of  whether  things  other  than  happiness  matter  for 
preferences in empirically-relevant choice situations. Relatedly, Truglia (2010) tests empirically whether the utility 
function  inferred  from  consumption  choices  is  distinguishable  from  the  estimated  happiness  function  over 
consumption. In contrast to our approach, where we measure individuals’ predictions about SWB, these alternative 
tests rely on ex post measured happiness. Hence these tests assume that people correctly predict the happiness 
consequences of their choices, while our tests do not. However, we still interpret individuals’ choices as revealing 
their ―true preferences‖—i.e. their assessment of their welfare—given their (potentially mistaken) beliefs about the 
consequences of their choices. This interpretation may be unjustified in situations where, e.g., due to social or moral 
pressure, choices do not reveal ―true preferences‖ (see Koszegi and Rabin, 2008). To the extent that the decision 
scenarios we study involve such situations, our finding that people sometimes make choices that do not maximize 
predicted SWB may overstate the discrepancy between ―true preferences‖ (or welfare) and SWB. However, our 
finding that people often choose an option that generates higher income despite predicting lower SWB for that 
option leans against this view; social or moral pressure would probably dictate choosing the lower-income option.  
7 In a between-subjects experiment with 66 undergraduates, Tversky and Griffin‘s participants were presented with a 
hypothetical choice between a job with a higher salary where co-workers earn even more versus a job with a lower 
salary where co-workers earn even less. Consistent with what we find in a similar choice problem, Tversky and 
Griffin find that participants are more likely to choose the higher absolute salary but say they would be happier with 
the higher relative salary. Tversky and Griffin interpret the result as supporting their theory that payoff levels are 
weighted more heavily in choice, while contrasts between payoffs and a reference point are weighted more heavily 
in SWB judgments.   6 
I. Survey Design 
While our main evidence is based on 29 different survey-versions, all versions share a 
similar underlying structure. Respondents are presented with a sequence of hypothetical 
scenarios, and in each they face a choice between two options. To illustrate, our ‗Scenario 1‘ 
highlights a tradeoff between sleep and income. Followed by its SWB and choice questions, it 
appears on one of our questionnaires as follows: 
 
Say you have to decide between two new jobs. The jobs are exactly the same in almost every way, 
but have different work hours and pay different amounts.  
 
Option 1: A job paying $80,000 per year. The hours for this job are reasonable, and you would be 
able to get about 7.5 hours of sleep on the average work night.  
 
Option 2: A job paying $140,000 per year. However, this job requires you to go to work at unusual 
hours, and you would only be able to sleep around 6 hours on the average work night. 
 
Between these two options, taking all things together, which do you think would give you a 
happier life as a whole? 
 
Option 1:  
Sleep more but earn less 
Option 2:  













X  X  X  X  X  X 
Please circle one X in the line above 
 
If you were limited to these two options, which do you think you would choose? 
 
Option 1:  
Sleep more but earn less 
Option 2:  













X  X  X  X  X  X 
Please circle one X in the line above 
 
In within-subject questionnaires, respondents are asked both the SWB question and the 
choice question above. In between-subjects questionnaires, respondents are initially or 
exclusively asked only one of the two questions.  
 
I.A. Populations and Studies   7 
We conducted surveys among 2,699 respondents from three populations: 1,066 patients 
at a doctor‘s waiting room in Denver who voluntarily filled out our questionnaires while waiting 
for their appointment; 1,000 adults who participated by telephone in the 2009 Cornell National 
Social Survey (CNSS) and form a nationally representative sample;
8 and 633 Cornell students 
who were recruited on campus and participated for pay or for course credit.
9 The Denver and 
Cornell studies include both within-subject and between-subjects survey variants, while the 
CNSS study is exclusively within-subject.
10 
Table 1 summarizes the design details of these studies. It lists each study‘s respondent 
population, sample size, scenarios used (see I.B below), types of questions asked (see I.C below), 
and other details such as response scales, scenario order, and question order.
11 The rest of this 
section explains the details summarized in the table. 
 
I.B. Scenarios 
  Our full set of 13 scenarios is given in the Appendix, starting with Scenario 1 (―sleep 
versus income‖) from the example above. Referring to scenarios by their scenario number (1 
through 13), table 1 reports which scenarios are used in which studies, and in what order they 
appear on different questionnaires. As detailed in the Appendix, some scenarios are asked in 
different variations (e.g. different wording, different quantities of money/sleep/commute time, 
etc.) and some scenarios are tailored to different respondent populations (e.g., while we ask 
students about school, we ask older respondents about work). In constructing the scenarios, we 
were guided by four considerations.  
First, we chose scenarios that highlight tradeoffs between options that the literature 
suggests might be important determinants of SWB. Hence, respondents face choices between 
jobs and housing options that are more attractive financially versus ones that allow for: in 
                                                 
8  The  CNSS  is  an  annual  survey  conducted  by  Cornell  University’s  Survey  Research  Institute.  For  details: 
https://sri.cornell.edu/SRI/cnss.cfm.  
9 We conducted additional, smaller, studies among another 924 participants. Briefly, they included a pilot of the 
Cornell  surveys  with  University  of  Chicago  Students  (102  respondents),  a  survey  of  Cornell  students  eliciting 
important decisions they face (171 respondents), as well as two surveys among the Denver sample (429 respondents) 
and a survey among Cornell students (222 respondents) that measured willingness-to-pay for greater SWB, among 
other things not related to this paper. For additional details, see the Web Appendix. 
10 In our Cornell between-subjects surveys, we use a design that allows us to also elicit within-subject data from our 
respondents, as described in section III.  
11 The median age in our Denver, CNSS, and Cornell samples is, respectively, 47, 49, and 21; the share of female 
respondents is 76, 53, and 60 percent. For summary statistics, see Web Appendix table A3.   8 
Scenario 1, more sleep (Kahneman et al., 2004; Kelly, 2004); in Scenario 12, a shorter commute 
(Stutzer and Frey, 2008); in 13, being around friends (Kahneman et al., 2004); and in 3, making 
more money relative to others (Luttmer, 2005; see Heffetz and Frank, forthcoming, for a survey). 
Second, since some of us were initially unsure we would find any divergences between 
predicted choice and SWB, in our earlier surveys we focused on choice situations where one‘s 
SWB may not be the only consideration. Hence, in Scenario 4 respondents choose between a 
career path that promises an ―easier‖ life with fewer sacrifices versus one that promises 
posthumous impact and fame, and in Scenarios 2 and 11 they choose between a more convenient 
or ―fun‖ option versus an option that might be considered ―the right thing to do.‖  
Third, once we found divergences between predicted SWB and choice, in our later 
surveys (the Cornell studies) we wanted to assess the magnitude of these divergences in 
scenarios that are representative of important decisions faced by our respondent population. For 
this purpose we asked a sample of students to list the three top decisions they made in the last 
day, the last month, the last two years, and in their whole lives.
12 Naturally, decisions that were 
frequently mentioned by respondents revolved around studying, working, socializing and 
sleeping. Hence, in the resulting Scenarios 7-10, individuals have to choose between socializing 
and fun versus sleep and schoolwork; traveling home for Thanksgiving versus saving the airfare 
money; attending a more fun and social college versus a highly selective one; and following 
one‘s passion versus pursuing a more practical career path. To these scenarios we added 
Scenario 6, where respondents choose between giving up two hours a week versus paying a 
weekly sum of money. With this relatively pedestrian scenario we also hoped to get an insight 
into our subjects‘ time-versus-money tradeoff.  
Fourth, as an informal check on our methods, we wanted to have one falsification-test 
scenario where we expected a respondent‘s choice and SWB ratings to coincide. For this 
purpose, we added Scenario 5, in which respondents face a choice between two food items 
(apple versus orange) that are offered for free and for immediate consumption. Since we 
carefully attempted to avoid any non-SWB differences between the options, we hypothesized 
that in this scenario, predicted SWB would most strongly predict choice. (Notice that this 
scenario has the additional attraction of being similar to prevalent decisions in almost everyone‘s 
                                                 
12 The sample included 102 University of  Chicago students; results  were subsequently supported by surveying 
another 171 Cornell students. See the Web Appendix for full details (including the classification of responses by 
―decision type‖).   9 
life, which is our third consideration above.) 
 
I.C. Main Questions  
(a) Choice question: In all studies, for each scenario, the choice question is presented as in our 
example above. In our analysis, we convert the horizontal six-point response scale into an 
intensity-of-choice variable, ranging from 1 to 6, or into a binary choice variable (―choose 
Option 1‖ versus ―choose Option 2‖).
13 We view answers to this question as measures of 
preference, and the binary variable as a measure of (hypothetical) pairwise-choice. 
 
(b) SWB question: While the language in the choice question is always kept the same, we vary 
the SWB question across questionnaire versions in order to examine how choice relates to 
several different, common SWB measures. In our Denver within-subject study we ask three 
different versions of the SWB question, modeled after what we view as three ―families‖ of SWB 
questions that are commonly-used in the literature (see examples in the epigraph): 
(i)  life satisfaction: ―Between these two options, which do you think would make you 
more satisfied with life, all things considered?‖;  
(ii) happiness with life as a whole: ―Between these two options, taking all things 
together, which do you think would give you a happier life as a whole?‖; and  
(iii)  felt happiness: ―Between these two options, during a typical week, which do you 
think would make you feel happier?‖
14 
  Since our between-subject tests have less statistical power than our within-subject tests, we 
ask only version (i) in our Denver between-subject surveys. In the CNSS study, where we were 
limited to one version of the SWB question due to design constraints, we ask only version (ii). 
As with the choice question, in the Denver study there are six possible answers (see the example 
                                                 
13 Responses in the CNSS study are elicited as a binary choice rather than as a six-point scale, because in telephone 
interviews the binary format is both briefer for interviewers to convey and easier for respondents to understand.  
14 A fourth family of SWB questions, notably seen in the Gallup World Poll and Pew Global Attitudes surveys, and 
more recently on the HRS and its sister studies in Europe, asks respondents to rank their lives on an objective scale 
without using happiness or satisfaction language. For example, the Gallup World Poll asks: ―Please imagine a 
ladder/mountain with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the 
ladder/mountain represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder/mountain represents the worst 
possible life for you. If the top step is 10 and the bottom step is 0, on which step of the ladder/mountain do you feel 
you personally stand at the present time?‖ This family of SWB questions is used when difficulties in translation 
make standard SWB questions unreliable. We did not include this type of measure in our experimental surveys, but 
consider studying ladder/mountain measures with the tools developed here a promising topic for further research.     10 
response-scales above) which we convert into either a six-point variable or a binary pairwise-
SWB-ranking variable; in the CNSS study, response is binary. 
  Finally, as described shortly, in our Cornell studies we ask respondents about twelve 
different aspects of life, of which (one‘s own) happiness is only one. In that study we use 
versions of (ii) and (iii) that are modified to remain meaningful, with fixed wording, across 
aspects. The modified (ii) and (iii) result in these two new versions:  
(iv) own happiness with life as a whole: ―Between these two options, taking all things 
together, which option do you think would make your life as a whole better in 
terms of … [your own happiness]‖; and  
(v)  immediately-felt own happiness: ―Between these two options, in the few minutes 
immediately after making the choice, which option do you think would make 
you feel better in terms of … [your own happiness].‖ 
The modified response scale now includes a middle ―no difference‖ response, and has seven 
possible answers (Option 1 definitely better; Option 1 probably better; Option 1 possibly better; 
no difference; Option 2 possibly better, etc.). Respondents are allowed to indicate ―no 
difference‖ for aspects of life that, in a given scenario, they judge irrelevant. We ask both (iv) 
and (v) in the Cornell within-subject surveys, and only (iv) in the Cornell between-subjects 
surveys.  
   
 (c) Questions about meta-choice and about other aspects of life: For completeness, we 
briefly mention here that some of our surveys contain the following additional questions. First, in 
all questionnaires of the Denver and Cornell within-subject studies, the choice question is 
followed by what we refer to as a meta-choice question: ―If you were limited to these two 
options, which would you want yourself to choose?‖  Second, as mentioned above, the SWB 
question in all Cornell studies is modified to elicit ratings of the two scenario options in terms of 
―own happiness‖ as well as eleven additional aspects of life. For example, in versions (iv) and (v) 
of the SWB question (see language above), [your own happiness] may be followed by [your 
family‘s happiness], [your health], [your romantic life], etc.
15 We discuss these additional 
                                                 
15 In some questionnaire versions, we separate ―own happiness‖ from the other eleven aspects, and ask respondents 
first only about own happiness in each scenario, and then, re-presenting the scenarios,  we ask about the other 
aspects. In these versions, we refer to the question on own happiness as an ―isolated‖ measure of SWB (see table 1).   11 
questions in sections III and IV, where we analyze the data they yield. 
   
II. Do People Respond to the Choice and SWB Questions in the Same Way?  
  In this section we look at respondents’ ranking of Option 1 versus Option 2 in terms of 
hypothetical choice compared with their ranking of the options in terms of predicted SWB. 
Viewing responses to the choice and the SWB questions as binary variables, we ask: Do 
respondents answer the two questions as if they were answering the same question, or do they 
answer them systematically differently? (We postpone analyzing responses as multi-point 
variables to section III.) Our analysis provides a first test of the null hypothesis that individuals 
seek to maximize SWB. 
  To answer our question, table 2 reports the distribution of binary responses to our surveys‘ 
choice and SWB questions by study and scenario, along with p-value statistics from equality-of-
proportions tests. The table pools responses across SWB question variants (see I.C(b) and table 1 
above); we discuss results by specific SWB measure below. The rest of this section interprets the 
figures reported in the table.
16 
 
II.A. Within-Subject Analysis 
  We start with table 2‘s leftmost column, which reports Scenario 1 figures from the 
Denver within-subject questionnaires (our ―sleep versus income‖ scenario from the example in 
section I). The column‘s top four cells report a vertically-stacked 22 contingency matrix, 
consisting of the joint binary distribution of subjects who favor Option 1 in the choice question, 
and those who favor it in the SWB question. Looking at these four cells, we point out two facts 
that illustrate the present section‘s two main findings. First, the top two cells reveal that SWB 
response is highly predictive of choice response: between the two cells, 87 percent of 
respondents rank Option 1 versus Option 2 in the choice question the same as they do in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In other versions, where the twelve aspects appear together either in the order specified above or in reverse order, we 
refer to the own happiness question as a ―first/last in a series‖ measure. 
16 Non-response in our surveys was generally low. In the Cornell studies, virtually all questions had a non-response 
rate below 2 percent (one Cornell respondent was excluded due to obvious confusion with instructions). In the 
CNSS, less than 5 percent of respondents answered ―Do not know‖ or refused to answer in any of the questions. Due 
to the less-structured  recruiting  method used in our  Denver doctor‘s office  studies, some questions  from those 
studies had non-response rates as high as 20 percent. However, the majority of this non-response is driven by 
respondents being called in for their appointments, alleviating concerns of selection bias. Comparing the completed 
responses of subjects who did not finish the complete survey to the responses of those who finished the entire 
survey, we find no evidence of a difference in average responses.    12 
SWB question. Second, the next two cells reveal systematic differences across the two questions 
among the remaining 13 percent of respondents: while 12 percent rank Option 1 (sleep) above 
Option 2 (income) in the SWB question and reverse this ranking in the choice question, only 1 
percent do the opposite. This asymmetry suggests that on average, respondents react to the two 
questions systematically differently. The fifth cell reports the p-value from a paired Liddell exact 
test, a (nonparametric) equality-of-proportions test (Liddell, 1983).
17 The null hypothesis—
namely, that the proportion of respondents who rank Option 2 above Option 1 does not depend 
on whether they answer the choice or the SWB question—is easily rejected.  
Examining the top five rows in table 2 for the rest of the Denver within-subject columns 
verifies that the two main findings above are not unique to Scenario 1: in the remaining five 
scenarios, 81 to 90 percent of respondents rank the two options identically across the choice and 
SWB questions; yet in four out of five cases, choice-SWB reversals among the remaining 10 to 
19 percent of respondents are asymmetric, and the equality-of-proportions null hypothesis across 
the two questions is easily rejected. In these cases, respondents rank income above legacy, 
concert above duty, low rent above short commute, and income above friends in higher 
proportions in the choice question than in the SWB question. Interestingly, there appears to be a 
systematic tendency among respondents to favor money in the choice question more than in the 
SWB question. 
Similarly, the CNSS column suggests that qualitatively, Scenario 1‘s findings carry over 
from our Denver study—a pencil-and-paper survey with six-point response scales administered 
to a convenience sample—to the CNSS study—a telephone survey with binary response scales 
administered to a nationally representative sample. While the proportion of participants with no 
choice-SWB reversals increases to 92 percent, almost all of the rest—7 out of the remaining 8 
percent—favor Option 1 (sleep) in the SWB question and Option 2 (income) in the choice 
question. The direction of this asymmetry is hence the same as in the Denver sample, and 
equality of proportions is again easily rejected. 
Last among our within-subject data, results from the Cornell surveys are reported on the 
                                                 
17 Conceptually, the Liddell exact test works as follows. For each respondent who answered both the SWB and the 
choice questions, one of his or her two responses is randomly (and hence, possibly falsely) reassigned to be treated 
as choice-response and the other as SWB-response. The difference between the proportions who favored Option 1 
over Option 2 in the (reassigned) choice versus SWB questions is recorded. This procedure is then repeated for 
every possible permutation of assignments. The Liddell p-value reports the fraction of repetitions that resulted in a 
difference in proportions equal to or greater than the actual difference in proportions in our data. Computationally, 
p-values are calculated using an exact formula.   13 
second page of table 2. The structure of this part of the table is similar to the corresponding 
Denver and CNSS parts, with the following three differences that result from the fact that the 
Cornell questionnaires allow for an additional ―no difference‖ response in the SWB question: (a) 
an additional row below the top four rows reports the proportion of respondents who choose the 
―no difference‖ response; (b) the top four rows report vertically-stacked contingency matrices as 
before, only here they exclude these ―no difference‖ responses (their sum is normalized to 100 
percent after dropping these responses); and (c) the ―no difference‖ responses are excluded from 
the Liddell tests.
18  
Starting again with Scenario 1 in the leftmost column, choice-SWB reversals (in the third 
and fourth rows, 24 percent together) are still a minority, although they are almost twice to three 
times more common in the Cornell sample than in the Denver and CNSS samples. Importantly, 
consistent with the Denver and CNSS data, in virtually all of these reversals—23 of the 24 
percent—Option 1 (sleep) is ranked above Option 2 (income) in the SWB question and below it 
in the choice question. Equality of proportions is, again, strongly rejected for this scenario.
19 
Moving to the rest of the Cornell within-subject columns reveals a similar story. Equality 
of proportions is strongly rejected for all the remaining nine scenarios (2-10) as well, with the 
exception of Scenario 5. Recall that we constructed Scenario 5 (―apple versus orange‖) as a 
falsification test, to alert us if our methods produced choice-SWB reversals they should not. We 
predicted that, barring problems with our methods, choice and SWB should largely coincide for 
this scenario. Reassuringly, the results support this prediction. Indeed, only 5 percent of 
responses exhibit reversals in this scenario, by far the lowest fraction among the ten scenarios.
20 
                                                 
18 Since respondents  must choose between Option 1 and 2 in the choice question,  we cannot observe  whether 
individuals  indicating  ―no  difference‖  for  SWB  support  or  weaken  the  equality-of-proportions  null  hypothesis. 
These individuals’ responses in the choice question mirror the distribution of choice-responses among the rest of the 
respondents reasonably closely (Web Appendix table A5), and, reassuringly, the choice proportions in table 2 are 
virtually unaffected by excluding these individuals. Moreover, under the null hypothesis that choice is determined 
solely by predicted SWB, the distribution of choice-responses should be closer to 50-50 for individuals indicating 
SWB ―no difference.‖ Hence, the responses of these respondents actually provide additional suggestive evidence 
against the null hypothesis. 
19 Comparing each of the top four cells in the scenario 1 column across the three within-subject samples reveals that 
the reported proportions differ dramatically between the samples. Given the very different populations and, in the 
CNSS study, the very different survey methods, this finding in itself is not surprising. (For example, we speculate 
that since a telephone survey is harder to understand, more respondents answered the two questions in the same way, 
taking the ―artificial consistency‖ mental shortcut discussed in II.B below.) 
20 Furthermore, we find no evidence that these reversals are in one systematic direction. At the same time, a sizeable 
37 percent of respondents indicate ―no difference‖ in the SWB question in scenario 5—by far the highest. This may 
suggest that scenario 5 is ―cleaner‖ than we intended it to be: not only non-SWB aspects of life, but even own   14 
As to the two other scenarios that are used in both the Denver and Cornell studies—Scenarios 3 
and 4—choice-SWB reversals maintain their direction: in both studies, (absolute) income is 
ranked above relative income (Scenario 3) and above legacy (Scenario 4) in the choice questions 
more often than in the SWB questions. (While equality of proportions is rejected in the Cornell 
data but not in the Denver data in Scenario 3, it is rejected in both studies in Scenario 4.)  
Finally, in Scenarios 6 and 8, which are used only in the Cornell studies and include a 
―money‖ option, we once again find that respondents favor money in the choice question more 
than in the SWB question. That this tendency holds in all seven scenarios that trade off more 
money/income for something else—be it more sleep, higher relative income, a legacy, a shorter 
commute, being around friends, having more time, or visiting family—suggests that survey-
based SWB measures understate the utility benefits of higher income.  
 
Our two main findings—that the ranking of the two options is identical across the choice 
and SWB questions for most respondents and in most scenarios, but that respondents react to the 
two questions systematically differently—hold not only in the pooled data, but also for each 
SWB question variant (i)-(v) separately. We show this in Web Appendix table A4, which reports 
versions of table 2 by SWB measure. Interestingly, we find some differences across the measures 
in the prevalence of choice-SWB reversals. In the Denver sample, the life satisfaction question 
variation (i) comes closest to matching choice, with only 11 percent of reversals, averaged across 
all scenarios. In comparison, happiness with life as a whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) yield more 
reversals—17 percent each. In the Cornell sample, own happiness with life as a whole (iv) and 
immediately felt own happiness (v) both yield 22 percent reversals. We return to the comparison 
between different SWB measures in section V.A below. 
 
II.B. Between-Subjects Analysis 
Our within-subject analysis above is based on both choice and SWB responses elicited 
from each individual. However, empirical work that uses SWB data relies on surveys that 
measure SWB alone, not together with choice. Thus, two potential biases could compromise the 
relevance of our findings to existing SWB survey data and their applications. On the one hand, 
                                                                                                                                                             
happiness is deemed by many respondents irrelevant in what they may perceive as a context of de gustibus non est 
disputandum.   15 
asking a respondent both questions might generate an ―artificial consistency‖ between the two 
responses. For example, respondents might think they ought to give consistent answers, or might 
give consistent answers as an effort-saving mental shortcut. On the other hand, an ―artificial 
inconsistency‖ bias is also possible if respondents infer from being asked more than one question 
that they ought to give different answers, or if the presence of the other question focuses 
participants‘ attention on the contrast between the wordings. 
To address these concerns, we compare the above results from the Denver and Cornell 
within-subject studies with their counterpart between-subjects studies, in which respondents are 
asked either just the choice or just the SWB question. For ease of comparison, the between-
subjects results are reported below the within-subject results on the two pages of table 2.  
We start with the Denver sample. While the Denver within-subject questionnaires use the 
three SWB variants (i)-(iii), their between-subjects counterpart uses only variant (i), the life 
satisfaction measure. Looking again at Scenario 1, of the between-subjects respondents who are 
presented with this SWB question, 34 percent rank Option 2 (income) above Option 1 (sleep). Of 
the respondents who are presented with the choice question, the proportion is 44 percent. The 
direction of the discrepancy is the same as in the within-subject data and, as reported by the 
Fisher exact test p-value, the difference is statistically distinguishable from zero.
21 In contrast, 
the other columns show that there is essentially no difference between the responses to the 
choice and the SWB questions in the rest of the scenarios in the Denver between-subjects study.  
Before comparing these proportion point estimates across the within- and between-
subjects data, we first compare statistical results. Since the unpaired Fisher test has less power 
than the paired Liddell test, table 2 also reports Fisher test results for the within-subject data. 
They are calculated by randomly assigning our subjects into two equal groups, and examining 
only either their choice or their SWB response (hence ―unpairing‖ these data). The reported 
average p-values (and average n) from 500 such repetitions show that a Fisher test rejects the no-
reversals null in (on average) one or two of our six within-subject scenarios (compared with one 
of the five between-subjects scenarios). In other words, when using a comparable low-power 
                                                 
21 We use the Fisher exact test as a non-parametric unpaired equality-of-proportions test. Conceptually, it works as 
follows. Remember that each respondent answers either the choice or the SWB question. These responses are pooled 
and reassigned (possibly falsely) into the two groups, and the proportion of those who rank Option 1 above Option 2 
in each group is recorded. This procedure is repeated for all possible permutations of assignments. The reported p-
value is the fraction of repetitions that resulted in difference in proportions at least as great as that between the two 
actual groups. Computationally, p-values are calculated using an exact formula.    16 
test, overall statistical results seem comparable.  
In order to compare the magnitudes of the choice-SWB reversals in the between- and 
within-subject data, we focus on only the three scenarios that are identical across the two 
studies
22 and on only those of the Denver within-subject respondents who answer the life 
satisfaction question (i) (reported in Web Appendix table A4). In this comparison, we find that 
while in Scenario 1 (income vs. sleep) discrepancies increase from 3 percentage points in the 
within- to 10 in the between-subjects data, in Scenario 13 (friends vs. income) they decrease 
from 7 to virtually nil, and in Scenario 3 (absolute income vs. relative income) they are 
essentially nil in both studies. Our overall interpretation of our Denver data with the life 
satisfaction measure—the measure with the fewest choice-SWB reversals—is that while there 
are clear differences across the within- and between-subjects studies, the evidence in either 
supports the same two main findings, albeit with differences in relative emphasis. 
Finally, our Cornell between-subjects questionnaires ask the ―own happiness with life as 
a whole‖ SWB question variant (iv). Starting again with the first scenario, results are strikingly 
similar to those in the Cornell within-subject data. On magnitudes, 66 percent favor Option 2 
(income) in the choice question while 46 percent favor Option 2 in the SWB question, similar to 
the corresponding proportions—68 and 45 percent—among the Cornell within-subject 
respondents who are asked SWB question variant (iv) (see Web Appendix table A4).
23 On 
statistical results, in spite of the reduced power of the unpaired Fisher test in the bottom row 
compared with the paired Liddell test directly above it, equality of proportions between the 
choice and SWB questions is still easily rejected in the between-subjects study.
  
Looking at the rest of the scenarios (in both tables) suggests that the finding in Scenario 
1—that the choice-SWB difference in proportions in the between-subjects data is similar to but 
slightly smaller than that in the within-subject data—is typical of only some scenarios. Of the ten 
scenarios in the Cornell studies, the difference maintains its sign but increases in one scenario 
(from 7 to 12 percent); decreases in four (from 23 to 20; 10 to 4; 11 to 9; and 11 to 8 percent); 
disappears in two (10 to 0; and 12 to 0 percent); and changes sign in three, including two very 
                                                 
22 As reported in table 1 and the Appendix, only scenarios 1, 3, and 13 are comparable across the studies: scenario 2 
is only included in the between-subjects study, and different versions of scenarios 4 and 12 are presented across the 
within- and between-subjects studies. For further explanation see the Web Appendix. 
23 Remember that in both studies, these figures exclude ―no difference‖ responses in the SWB question. We note 
that such ―no difference‖ responses seem more prevalent in the within- than in the between-subjects data. See Web 
Appendix table A4, where we report their prevalence by design variations.      17 
large changes (1 to -5; 20 to -13; and 24 to -11 percent). The Fisher test at the bottom row rejects 
the null hypothesis in three of the ten scenarios in the Cornell between-subjects data—strikingly 
similar to the Fisher test reported in the ―Average p-value from 500 repetitions‖ row for the 
within-subject data.  
As with the Denver data, our overall interpretation is that while there are differences 
across the between- and the within-subject studies—in particular, choice-SWB reversals are on 
average less pronounced in the between-subjects study—either set of studies supports our two 
main findings. 
 
II.C. Measurement Error 
Our analysis above suggests that in many scenarios, individuals do not respond to the 
choice and SWB questions as if they were responding to the same question. However, in a given 
scenario, such rejection of the null hypothesis could be explained by differences in measurement 
error across the two questions—for example, because it is easier to introspect about choice than 
about SWB, or vice versa. An individual whose ―true‖ ranking of the options is identical across 
the questions is more likely to mistakenly rank the ―wrong‖ option higher in a question with 
greater measurement error, leading to ranking proportions closer to 50-50 for that question.  
Looking across table 2‘s columns reveals that cross-question differences in the 
measurement error variances for choice and SWB in the same direction in all scenarios in a study 
cannot explain our data. For example, in the Denver within-subject data, choice proportions are 
closer to 50-50 in Scenarios 1, 11, and 13, but SWB proportions are closer in Scenarios 4 and 12. 
We postpone further discussion of measurement error to the end of section III. 
 
To summarize, the two main findings in this section are (a) that most respondents in most 
scenarios do not exhibit choice- versus SWB-ranking reversals, and (b) that when they do, their 
pattern of reversals is systematic. Overall, the two findings hold up well—although with 
differences in relative strength—across scenarios, populations, and designs. Furthermore, these 
findings cannot be explained by a measurement error structure that is stable across scenarios.  
 
III. Do Non-SWB Factors Help Predict Choice? 
  In this section we take a second approach to assessing whether individuals seek to   18 
maximize SWB. We ask: Can we identify non-SWB factors that help explain choices, controlling 
for predicted SWB? We also analyze by how much respondents’ choices can be explained by 
their predicted SWB and non-SWB aspects of life together, compared with their predicted SWB 
alone.  
  We address these questions using data from the Cornell sample, where we ask respondents 
to rank the options on a set of eleven non-SWB aspects of life, in addition to ranking them on 
choice and SWB (see section I.C). Specifically, in addition to being asked about ―your own 
happiness,‖ respondents are also asked about: your family‘s happiness, your health, your 
romantic life, your social life, your control over your life, your life‘s level of spirituality, your 
life‘s level of fun, your social status, your life‘s non-boringness, your physical comfort, and your 
sense of purpose. While still a limited list, we chose these aspects of life in an attempt to capture 
what else, besides one‘s own happiness, might enter one‘s preferences and hence matter for 
choice. Our list is guided by economists‘ and philosophers‘ enumeration of ―capabilities‖ (Sen, 
1985; Nussbaum, 2000), non-hedonic components of SWB proposed by psychologists (White 
and Dolan, 2009), and our own introspection (for example, we tried to include all aspects that 
money can buy, such as physical comfort).  
As mentioned above, in our Cornell between-subjects surveys we use a design that allows 
us also to elicit within-subject data from our 201 participants. This is done by presenting subjects 
with the between-subjects part of the survey, followed by an additional, within-subject part.
24 In 
the between-subjects analysis in section II we used only data from the first, between-subjects 
part. In contrast, in this section we pool data from both parts, treating them as within-subject 
data. Further pooling these data with the original Cornell within-subject data (432 respondents) 
yields an augmented sample of 633 Cornell within-subject respondents. In this section we 
analyze this pooled data set. In section IV.E and in the Web Appendix we show that our main 
results hold in the constituent subsamples. 
                                                 
24 Specifically, we present the entire sequence of ten scenarios three times. First, each scenario is presented and is 
followed by only a choice question (for half the respondents) or only a SWB question (for the other half). Second, 
after respondents finish answering their question for each of the ten scenarios, the ten scenarios are presented again, 
each followed by only the question (SWB or choice) respondents have not seen yet. Finally, the ten scenarios are 
presented  for  a  third  time,  with  each  scenario  followed  by  the  non-SWB  aspect  questions.  Respondents  are 
specifically instructed to answer the surveys in exactly the order questions are presented, and the experimenters 
verify  that  they  do  (in  the  rare  cases  where  a  respondent  was  observed  to  flip  through  the  pages,  she/he  was 
promptly reminded of this instruction). With this design, excluding data collected after the first round of scenario-
presentation results in between-subjects data.   19 
 
III.A. Response distributions 
Figure 1 displays, by scenario, the histograms of raw, multi-point responses to the choice, 
SWB, and eleven non-SWB-aspect questions. Note first that the choice responses—and also the 
SWB responses, although to a lesser extent—tend to be bimodal with most of the mass on 
―definitely‖ or ―probably,‖ suggesting that the choice-SWB reversals discussed in section II are 
not the result of widespread near-indifferences. Second, notice that we were rather successful in 
constructing Scenario 5 (apple versus orange): almost everyone indicates ―no difference‖ on non-
SWB aspects of the options. While 37 percent also indicate ―no difference‖ on SWB, the low 
count of reversals in Scenario 5 suggests that for the other respondents, variation in choice is 
strongly related to variation in SWB. Finally, note that in many other scenarios, there is 
substantial variation in the non-SWB aspect rankings, and that the histogram of choice responses 
sometimes looks rather different from the histogram of SWB responses. 
 
III.B. Predicting choice 
Table 3 presents a variety of specifications in which we regress choice on SWB and non-
SWB aspects of life, aggregating data across the ten scenarios (we discuss regressions by 
scenario in section V.B below). We want to estimate the relationship from the within-scenario—
rather than the between-scenario—variation in responses. For this purpose, in the probit and 
ordered probit specifications, we include scenario fixed effects.
25 In the OLS specifications, we 
demean all variables at the scenario level. Doing so yields identical coefficients to a fixed-effects 
OLS specification but has the advantage that the R
2‘s reflect only the within-scenario 
explanatory power of the regressors. Interpreting the first three columns in table 3 as an attempt 
to predict choice responses in our data, we first focus only on R
2‘s. We return to interpreting 
coefficients in the next subsection. 
The first column of table 3 reports an OLS regression of six-point choice on seven-point 
SWB. As reported by the R
2, 0.38 of the variation in choice is explained by SWB (own 
happiness) alone. In comparison, a regression of the same choice measure on our eleven non-
SWB aspects (each as a seven-point variable) yields an R
2 of 0.21 (second column of table 3). 
                                                 
25  Including  fixed  effects  in  non-linear  models  is  problematic  in  cases  where  the  number  of  fixed  effects  is 
asymptotically  infinite.  Since  our  asymptotics  rely  on  an  infinite  number  of  respondents,  not  of  scenarios,  the 
inclusion of scenario fixed effects does not harm the consistency of our estimates.    20 
Hence, we find that SWB predicts choice substantially better than all of the other aspects 
combined. In the third column we regress choice on both SWB and the eleven non-SWB aspects. 
The R
2 of 0.41 is again substantially higher than that in the second column but is only slightly 
higher than that in the first column.
26 The pattern in these three columns is similar when we relax 
the linear functional form, replacing each regressor with a set of six dummy variables (not 
reported): the respective R
2‘s are 0.46, 0.33, and 0.50. In summary, when we pool data across 
scenarios we find that adding the non-SWB aspects to the regression of choice on SWB increases 
explanatory power, but the increase is quite modest. (However, the increase is substantial in 
some of the individual scenarios, as we report in section V.B.) 
 
III.C. Comparing the coefficients 
In order to interpret—and compare—the regression coefficients in table 3, we need to 
provide more structure. We hence assume that choices result from maximizing a utility function, 
 
(1)            U(H(X), X), 
 
where H is SWB and X is a vector of non-SWB factors that might affect utility both directly, and 
indirectly through H. If people seek to maximize SWB alone (as opposed to trading off SWB for 
other, non-SWB factors), then the (vector) partial derivative ∂U/∂X will be identically zero. To a 
first-order approximation, the difference in utility between two options in a decision problem is 
 
(2)          ∆U ≈ (∂U/∂H) ∆H + (∂U/∂X) ∆X, 
 
where ∆H and ∆X are the differences between the options in predicted SWB and predicted non-
SWB aspects, respectively. Naturally, the smaller are these differences, the more justified is the 
approximation—a point we return to shortly.  
  We can now interpret the OLS regression from the third column of table 3 as estimating 
the implied regression equation, 
 
                                                 
26 Bootstrapped standard errors yield the following 95-percent confidence intervals around the three respective R
2‘s: 
[0.36, 0.40], [0.19, 0.23], and [0.39, 0.43].   21 
(3)          ∆Uis = βH ∆His + βX ∆Xis + εis, 
 
where ∆Uis, ∆His, and ∆Xis are, respectively, respondent i's choice, SWB, and non-SWB 
responses in Scenario s (raw responses demeaned at the scenario level); and εis is an error term, 
which captures the direct effects of unmeasured differences between the options as well as 
choice mistakes.  Under this interpretation, the twelve regression coefficients estimate marginal 
utilities.  
  Under this approximation, the null hypothesis ∂U/∂X ≡ 0 can be rewritten as the 
hypothesis that the vector βX = 0, or that all eleven non-SWB coefficients in the third column are 
zero—a hypothesis we can easily reject (F-test p = 0.000). This result is robust to treating the 
choice measure as ordinal rather than cardinal, or as binary (the ordered probit and probit 
specifications in the fifth and sixth columns); to relaxing the linearity of our SWB measure by 
replacing it with a set of six dummy variables; and to combinations of these specifications (see 
tables A7-A9 in the Web Appendix for these and other specifications). Furthermore, with the 
exception of Scenario 8 (where F-test p = 0.086), the result holds in each individual scenario.
27 
This and the robustness to relaxing the linearity of ∆H suggest that not all the marginal utilities 
∂U/∂X are zero, regardless of how good an approximation we use in equation (2). 
To move from testing the null hypothesis to interpreting the magnitudes of coefficients 
requires additional assumptions. Econometrically, the coefficients in regression equation (3) are 
consistently estimated if E(εis | ∆His, ∆Xis) = 0. We measure a long list of non-SWB aspects as an 
attempt to make this assumption more plausible; an unmeasured factor will bias the coefficient 
on the regressors it is correlated with. Psychologically, the coefficients are comparable if 
respondents respond to the seven-point scales similarly across the twelve aspects.  
Comparing the coefficients in the third column of table 3, the coefficient on SWB is by 
far the largest. A one-point increase in our seven-point measure of predicted SWB is associated 
with a highly significant 0.46-point increase in our six-point choice measure. The largest non-
SWB coefficients are on sense of purpose (0.12), control over one‘s life (0.08), family happiness 
(0.08), and social status (0.06). The relative sizes of the coefficients are similar in alternative 
                                                 
27 We show in table A10 in the Web Appendix that this result holds even when the regressions include only aspects 
for which more than a trivial fraction of respondents (e.g. 15 percent) indicate answers other than ―no difference.‖ In 
other words, it holds even when we include only the most reliably-estimated coefficients. Interestingly, table A10 
shows that the only large and robust non-SWB coefficient in the ―apple versus orange‖ scenario is that on ―physical 
comfort‖; this seems consistent with the de gustibus (or taste-related) interpretation of this scenario.   22 
specifications (e.g., the ordered probit column), but we remind the reader that the data are pooled 
across surveys that use two opposite orders in which aspects are presented, and order matters for 
the coefficient estimates (see section IV.E). While the rejection of βX = 0 suggests that SWB is 
not the only argument in the utility function, a comparison of the coefficients suggests that the 
marginal utility of SWB is several times larger than the marginal utilities of even the most 
significant non-SWB aspects we measure.
28 
Finally, related to the question to what extent people seek to maximize SWB, we can ask 
to what extent people prefer a higher level of some non-SWB aspect because it increases SWB. 
Rewriting equation (2) as ∆U ≈ [(∂U/∂H) (∂H/∂X) + (∂U/∂X)] ∆X decomposes the net effect on 
utility of a change in X into an indirect effect that operates through ∆H and a direct effect. The 
coefficients in the second column of table 3 estimate the sum of the indirect and direct marginal 
effects, (∂U/∂H) (∂H/∂X) + (∂U/∂X). In the third column, the coefficient on SWB estimates 
∂U/∂H, while the coefficients on the non-SWB aspects estimate the direct marginal effects, 
∂U/∂X. Under this causal interpretation of the coefficients, comparing the second and third 
columns suggests that, for example, while the effects of health and life’s non-boringness on 
utility operate only through their effects on SWB, the entire effect of social status operates 
directly (without affecting SWB). In between these extremes, aspects such as family happiness, 
control over one’s life, life’s level of fun, physical comfort, and sense of purpose seem to have 
roughly equal direct and indirect effects on utility. 
 
III.D. Measurement error  
Measurement error in ∆His or ∆Xis will cause the assumption E(εis | ∆His, ∆Xis) = 0 to fail, 
therefore biasing the coefficient estimates. Moreover, measurement error in ∆His could also 
invalidate our tests of the null hypothesis that βX ≡ 0; even if predicted non-SWB aspects do not 
enter utility directly, if they affect predicted SWB, and if predicted SWB is measured with error, 
we could find—as we do—that the predicted non-SWB aspects are statistically significant 
predictors of choice. In order to address these concerns, we collected repeated observations on a 
sub-sample (of 230) of our Cornell respondents. This enables us to estimate a measurement-
error-corrected equation (3). Specifically, we use Simulation-Extrapolation (SIMEX) (Cook and 
                                                 
28 However, we believe that the most plausible bias from unmeasured factors exaggerates the coefficient on SWB. 
Specifically, an unmeasured factor whose effect on ∆H has the same sign as its direct effect (i.e., not through ∆H) on 
∆U will bias upward the coefficient on ∆H.   23 
Stefanski, 1994), a semi-parametric method that assumes homoskedastic additive measurement 
error but does not make assumptions about the distribution of the regressors.
29 Intuitively, the 
SIMEX method proceeds in two steps. First, it simulates datasets with additional measurement 
error and uses them to estimate the function describing how the regression coefficients change 
with the amount of measurement error. Then the algorithm extrapolates in order to estimate what 
the coefficients would be if there were no measurement error in the original data. Table 3 
displays the results of applying this method to our regressions. As expected, relative to the OLS 
results, the coefficient on own happiness increases, and remains by far the most predictive 
regressor. However, the non-SWB aspects with largest coefficients and statistical significance in 
the OLS regressions remain statistically significant and also increase. 
These results suggest that SWB is not the only argument in the utility function and that 
non-SWB aspects of life enter preferences as well. At the same time, among the aspects we 
measure, SWB has by far the highest marginal utility.  
 
IV. Robustness 
To examine the robustness of our results from sections II and III, we conduct a long list 
of additional analyses. Full details, including all tables, charts, and statistics, are available in the 
Web Appendix. In this section we briefly summarize our findings. Unless stated otherwise, they 
are based on our within-subject data from either the Denver or the (augmented) Cornell samples. 
 
IV.A. Are results driven by only a few individuals? 
A natural interpretation of our evidence from sections II and III is that most people‘s 
preferences assign high but not exclusive weight to SWB, and therefore people usually but not 
always choose the option they predict would maximize SWB. However, an alternative 
interpretation is that most people exclusively seek to maximize SWB, and our results are driven 
by a small minority of participants who do not. In contrast with this latter interpretation, we find 
                                                 
29 We choose to use the SIMEX method over several more common measurement error correction methods (such as 
IV or regression disattenuation) for several reasons. Primarily, the other methods are highly inefficient. Moreover, 
the SIMEX method is flexible in its treatment of the measurement error structure, it accommodates misclassified 
categorical data, and it easily accommodates non-linear models such as probit or ordered probit regressions. For 
additional discussion of SIMEX see the Web appendix, and for IV results see table A12 there. For example, in our 
IV estimates, standard errors are so large that we cannot reject that any of the OLS or SIMEX coefficients reported 
in table 3 are equal to the IV coefficients, with one exception: the 0.46 coefficient on own happiness in the OLS 
regression (third column) is significantly lower than the corresponding IV coefficient, which is 0.75.     24 
that most respondents (both Denver and Cornell) exhibit at least one reversal and that very few 
exhibit reversals in half or more of the scenarios.  
Moreover, we explore whether some of the respondents who do not exhibit a choice-
SWB reversal in a given scenario would have done so if that scenario‘s tradeoff between SWB 
and non-SWB factors had assigned a different ―price‖ to SWB. We do this by presenting some of 
our Denver respondents with four different versions of Scenario 4, a choice between a career as 
an artist who earns $40,000 annually and will have a lasting legacy versus a higher-paying career 
as a commercial artist who will leave no legacy. The versions differ from each other in the 
commercial artist‘s annual income: it is $42,000, $60,000, $80,000, or $100,000. We find that 
the fraction of participants who exhibit a choice-SWB reversal varies from as low as 3 percent in 
the $42k version to as high as 17 percent in the $80k version. Overall, 24 percent exhibit a 
reversal in at least one income-version, suggesting that the fraction of individuals for whom we 
observe a reversal in a given scenario is a lower bound on the total number who would exhibit a 
reversal in the same scenario with some ―price of SWB.‖ 
 
IV.B. Scenario-order effects and participant fatigue 
  We investigate the effects of scenario order on responses with our Denver sample, where 
respondents face the six scenarios in one of two opposite orders (see table 1). Scenario-order 
effects could arise, for example, due to increasing fatigue or boredom among respondents. They 
could either increase or decrease the number of choice-SWB reversals through increasing 
response variance, decreasing respondents‘ effort, and in general changing artificial consistency 
or inconsistency patterns. While we indeed find evidence of scenario-order effects on responses 
in individual scenarios, they do not seem to influence our main findings. Averaged across the six 
scenarios, 15 percent of respondents exhibit a choice-SWB reversal in a scenario, regardless of 
whether it appears in the first or second half of the survey (Fisher exact test p = 0.87).  
 
IV.C. Self-reported artificial consistency/inconsistency and mistakes 
  In section II we address artificial consistency and inconsistency concerns, as well as 
measurement error that in all scenarios is either larger for choice than for SWB, or vice versa. In 
section III, our measurement-error-corrected regressions address the possibility of response 
mistakes that are uncorrelated across repetitions of the survey. As an additional check on these   25 
and other concerns, after our Cornell respondents finish responding to all the decision scenarios, 
we directly ask them whether their choice-SWB reversals were a mistake; whether they think 
they would regret them; and whether they were trying to make their choice and SWB responses 
consistent. Interestingly, only 7 percent report their reversals as a mistake, 23 percent report that 
they would regret them, and 20 percent report consciously trying to make their choice and SWB 
consistent. We repeat section III‘s analysis excluding groups of respondents based on their 
responses. We find, in line with our findings from our earlier approaches, that while mistakes 




  A related concern is that choice-SWB reversals may reflect a self-control problem (as in 
Laibson, 1997 and O‘Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), rather than a preference for non-SWB aspects 
of life.
30 To address this concern, in some versions of the survey, in addition to asking 
participants what they would choose, we also ask them what they would want themselves to 
choose (the meta-choice question mentioned in Section I.C(c)).  We reasoned that if, for 
example, a participant preferred Option 1 but would choose Option 2 due to a self-control 
problem, the participant would indicate favoring Option 2 in the choice question but Option 1 in 
the meta-choice question. Aggregating across all surveys that include the meta-choice question 
(see table 1), we find reversals between choice and meta-choice in 28 percent of the cases. 
However, while self-control problems may be relevant in these cases, our main conclusions from 
section III appear to be robust to excluding these observations. For example, in our benchmark 
specification from the third column of table 3, while excluding observations with a choice/meta-
choice inconsistency increases the coefficient on own happiness, it also increases the coefficient 
on sense of purpose. 
 
                                                 
30 In most of our decision scenarios, it is not obvious how a self-control problem would be implicated, but there are a 
few where it could be.  For example, in scenario 7, one of the alternatives is staying out later with friends, while the 
other  is  going  to  bed  earlier  to  feel  better  and  be  more  productive  the  next  day.  A  respondent  who  correctly 
anticipates having a self-control problem might respond that she would choose to stay out late, even though her 
welfare would be maximized by going to bed earlier.   26 
IV.E. Context of choice, SWB, and non-SWB aspect questions 
  Closely related to concerns of artificial consistency and inconsistency, it is possible that 
our results are affected by the organization of our choice, SWB, and non-SWB aspect questions. 
Specifically, respondents‘ interpretations of the questions or their understanding of the meaning 
of the related concepts may be context-dependent.
31 For example, when the choice and SWB 
questions appear close together (as in our example scenario in section I), respondents may 
interpret each of the questions differently from how they interpret each when presented 
separately. Additionally, interpretations of the questions may depend on whether the choice 
question appears before or after the SWB question in each scenario.  
It is similarly possible that respondents‘ interpretation of ―own happiness‖ depends on 
whether it appears as a stand-alone question or as merely one aspect of life in a list of twelve. For 
example, when ―own happiness‖ appears as an aspect in a list, respondents may interpret it to 
refer to only the part of own happiness that is not correlated with—or affected by—the other 
aspects on the list (―happiness controlled for other aspects of life‖). Finally, the order in which 
the twelve aspects are presented may affect responses, for example because order affects the 
aspects‘ interpretation, or because respondents pay less attention to aspects at the bottom of the 
list.  
As mentioned in sections I (see table 1) and III, different versions of our surveys vary in 
whether the choice and SWB questions are asked close together or far apart, and in the order the 
questions are asked; they also vary in the distance between the SWB and non-SWB aspects, and 
in the order of aspects. Repeating our analysis in section III by questionnaire organization 
verifies that such order and context effects do indeed matter. We briefly summarize the main 
findings. First, aspects listed earlier have larger coefficients. Second, own happiness as part of a 
twelve-aspects list has a smaller coefficient than as a stand-alone question. Third, a design where 
we present each scenario to solicit only choice for that scenario, then present each scenario again 
to solicit only happiness, and then present each scenario yet a third time to solicit only non-SWB 
aspect ratings yields the lowest coefficient on own happiness (0.31). That design also yields, in 
one of the aspect orderings, the highest coefficient on sense of purpose (0.27), making it the 
highest coefficient on any of our non-SWB aspects in any of the designs. Yet, in all designs, non-
                                                 
31 Notice the important difference between this possibility and the possibility of cross-respondent differences in the 
interpretations or understanding of the scenarios. The latter possibility is a lesser concern as long as a respondent’s 
interpretation or understanding of a scenario remains the same across the choice and SWB questions.   27 
SWB aspects are statistically significant, and the coefficient on own happiness has a higher point 
estimate than any of the non-SWB aspects. While the context in which we ask our key survey 
questions definitely matters, our basic results appear to be robust. 
 
IV.F. An alternative approach: willingness-to-pay questions 
  Our empirical methodology in section III was to assess the marginal utility of SWB and 
other factors by confronting participants with a series of scenarios, and estimating the 
coefficients from a regression of choice on predicted SWB and non-SWB aspect ratings of the 
choice options. As another source of evidence on marginal utilities, which we can use to cross-
validate our regression-based findings, we also ask questions aimed to directly elicit participants‘ 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improving SWB and other aspects of their lives. 
Near the end of the Cornell surveys, after participants had faced all of the scenarios, we 
ask them, for the list of twelve aspects, the maximum amount of minutes per week they would be 
willing to invest in improving their rating of their life on that aspect by one point on a ten-point 
scale. Consistent with our regression-based findings, own happiness has the largest WTP.
32 
Moreover, the correlation between mean WTP and the coefficient from a univariate OLS 
regression of choice on each aspect individually is 0.67 (p < 0.02).
33 SWB has a large impact on 
this correlation coefficient because it has both a high WTP and a high regression coefficient. To 
assess the robustness of the correlation, we omit SWB from the set of aspects; in that case, the 
correlation is 0.49, economically sizeable but not statistically significant (p = 0.12).
34  
We interpret these WTP-based findings as broadly supportive of our scenario-based findings. 
 
                                                 
32 We measure WTP in units of time because we expect time to be more comparable across respondents than money 
for our student sample. Response categories are 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 45, 60, 75, and 120 minutes. Both mean WTP 
for own happiness (69 minutes) and its median (60 minutes) are well below the highest response option of 120 
minutes (34 percent chose the latter). Across all of our survey populations, we similarly find that WTP for SWB is 
typically below the highest response option in a variety of questions including, for example, asking respondents 
what fraction of their income or what amount of meditation time they would be willing to devote to raise happiness. 
Although there are well-known reasons to be skeptical about contingent valuation questions, especially those far 
removed from everyday experience, this response pattern may be interpreted as suggesting that respondents think 
about a tradeoff between SWB and other aspects of their life when answering these questions. 
33  The univariate coefficient, as opposed to the coefficient from the multivariate regression reported in table 3, is the 
appropriate one to use for comparability with the WTP question because the WTP question does not partial out 
spillover effects on the other characteristics when eliciting WTP to improve one characteristic. 
34 These correlations might be inflated if aspects listed earlier have both larger coefficients (see section IV.E) and 
higher WTP; however, we find high correlations even between coefficients measured in one aspect order and WTPs 
measured in the opposite order.    28 
V. Additional Results 
To provide additional results that may be useful for happiness researchers and policy 
makers, we conduct the analysis from section III separately across SWB measures, scenarios, 
and respondent characteristics. This section is a brief summary of a more thorough treatment in 
the Web Appendix.  
 
V.A. Comparing SWB measures 
Across our surveys, we ask five different SWB question variants, based on three families 
of SWB questions asked in large-scale surveys used for empirical work: life satisfaction, 
happiness with life as a whole, and felt happiness (see section I.C(b) and table 1). In section II.A 
we compare the frequency of choice-SWB reversals across our different SWB measures. We 
now compare how well the measures predict choice using R
2‘s from univariate OLS regressions 
of our multiple-point choice variable on our multiple-point SWB measures. 
  As in section III, we demean our variables at the scenario level. In the Denver sample, the 
life satisfaction question variant (i) is the best predictor of the choice question, with R
2 = 0.65. 
Happiness with life as a whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) come second and third, respectively, 
with R
2 = 0.59 and 0.55. The felt happiness R
2 is statistically significantly lower than the life 
satisfaction R
2 (p = 0.02 calculated using bootstrapped standard errors), and the R
2 for happiness 
with life as a whole is not statistically distinguishable from the other two. In the Cornell sample, 
own happiness with life as a whole (iv) and immediately felt own happiness (v) have R
2 = 0.39 
and 0.37, not statistically distinguishable from each other.  
These R
2‘s and our findings in II.A paint a consistent picture. While in the Denver data 
the life-satisfaction-type SWB question is more predictive of choice than the happiness-type 
SWB questions, in both Denver and Cornell the felt happiness and the happiness with life as a 
whole questions predict choice similarly. One possible hypothesis as to why some SWB 
measures predict choice better is that they encourage participants to report the present value of 
SWB flows over time. However, our finding that variant (v)—about happiness ―in the few 
minutes immediately after making the choice‖—is as predictive of choice as variant (iv)— about 
happiness in ―life as a whole‖—is inconsistent with this view. 
 
V.B. Heterogeneity across decision scenarios   29 
  For applied work, it is useful to know in which situations the assumption that people try 
to maximize only SWB is a better or worse approximation. Table 4 shows the benchmark OLS 
specification from table 3, conducted separately for each of the ten scenarios in the Cornell data. 
The ―Incremental R
2‖ row reports the difference between the reported R
2’s (from the reported 
multivariate regressions) and R
2’s from univariate regressions of choice on only SWB (which are 
not reported).   
Mechanically, if utility is increasing in SWB, then a ranking of decision alternatives 
resulting from utility-maximization and a ranking resulting from SWB-maximization will 
coincide in choice settings where predicted SWB happens to be the only aspect that varies across 
the choice alternatives. As discussed above, Scenario 5 (apple versus orange)—which was 
designed to be as close as possible to such a case—has very little variance in non-SWB aspects 
and the fewest choice-SWB reversals (see figure 1 and table 2). As expected, the R
2 in a 
univariate regression of choice on predicted SWB is the highest (at 0.56) in Scenario 5, and the 
incremental R
2 from adding all other aspects is the lowest (at 0.02). If this type of minor 
decision—which possibly comprises most decisions in life—generally features low variance in 
non-SWB aspects, then the assumption that people try to maximize predicted SWB is a good 
approximation in such settings. The next highest univariate R
2 is for Scenario 3 (absolute income 
vs. relative income, at 0.49). This result is a surprise to us. We did not expect predicted SWB to 
capture the issues involved in the choice between absolute and relative income as well as it does.     
Interestingly, at the other extreme, the four scenarios we designed to be representative of 
typical important decisions facing our college-age Cornell sample—Scenarios 7-10 (socialize 
versus sleep, family versus money, education versus social life, and interest versus career)—are 
among the scenarios with the lowest univariate R
2 and, correspondingly, the highest incremental 
R
2 from adding non-SWB aspects as regressors. Indeed, in Scenarios 7 and 10, where univariate 
R
2 is the lowest—at 0.25 and 0.24, respectively—incremental R
2 is 0.07 and 0.13. Here, non-
SWB aspects increase predictive power (as measured by R
2) substantially, by 28 and 54 percent 
respectively. This in turn suggests that one should be especially cautious in interpreting 
measured SWB as utility in empirical applications that focus on important life decisions.  
The rest of the scenarios fall somewhere in between. They include the scenarios that were 
designed to explore common themes from the happiness literature and, surprisingly, those 
designed as situations where we most expected to find tensions between SWB and non-SWB   30 
factors (see section I.B). 
Finally, table 4 reveals a heterogeneity in coefficients across scenarios (Chow test p = 
0.000). Moreover, this heterogeneity appears to be systematic, with an increased coefficient on 
SWB and decreased coefficients on non-SWB factors in scenarios where there is less variance 
across the choice alternatives in non-SWB factors. In contrast, our simple theoretical framework 
from section III predicts constant marginal utilities and hence constant coefficients across 
scenarios. We speculate that this empirical heterogeneity results from the fact that in scenarios 
where some aspect varies less, that aspect becomes less salient as an input into utility, and 
respondents tend to take it into account less when making a choice.
35 Regardless of the 
explanation for the heterogeneity, it reinforces the assessment that predicted SWB may be a 
better approximation of utility in minor than in important decisions. 
 
V.C.  Preference heterogeneity across respondents 
  For a policymaker deciding whether to use SWB data as a proxy for utility for a 
particular demographic group, it may be useful to know how the propensity to maximize 
predicted SWB varies with demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, race, education, 
and income. In the Web Appendix, we report regressions that predict choice-SWB reversals as a 
function of respondent characteristics. In the Cornell sample, black respondents are 24 
percentage points more likely than white ones to exhibit a choice-SWB reversal (with a standard 
error of 10 percentage points). However, on the whole across the Denver, CNSS, and Cornell 
samples, there is relatively little evidence for heterogeneity across demographic groups.  
To see how heterogeneity in maximizing predicted SWB relates to well-understood 
dimensions of individual heterogeneity, we also predict the probability of a choice-SWB reversal 
                                                 
35  In  the  Web  Appendix  we  examine  and  rule  out  several  alternative  explanations.  First,  since  our  regression 
equation (3) relies on a first-order approximation of the utility function (1), one possible explanation of the above 
empirical heterogeneity is that the approximation breaks down in scenarios where the choice alternatives differ 
greatly in some aspects. Second, coefficients may be different in scenarios where both choice alternatives are far 
from the respondent’s current situation, either because the relevant marginal utilities are not the same or because the 
respondent has difficulty predicting choice in  fanciful  hypothetical settings. We test these two explanations by 
running separate regressions for scenarios where we expect the local approximation to hold well or not; we find little 
evidence for differences in coefficients across these categories. Third, the coefficients may be identified off of 
different respondents in different scenarios. However, Cook’s influence statistic (calculated at the respondent level) 
is highly correlated across most scenarios, and influence-robust iteratively reweighted least squares regressions still 
yield coefficients that vary across scenarios. This suggests that identification off of different respondents is not 
driving the variation in our coefficients across scenarios. We cannot rule out other explanations, such as respondents 
scaling their responses differently in different scenarios.   31 
as a function of scores on the ―Big 5‖ personality traits, which we measure in the Cornell within-
subject sample using John and Srivastava‘s (1999) BFI scale. We find that a one standard 
deviation increase in conscientiousness is associated with an 2 percent lower likelihood of a 
choice-SWB reversal, while a one standard deviation increase in neuroticism (i.e., moody, tense) 
is associated with a 2 percent higher likelihood. 
 
VI. Discussion 
  When aggregating our results across scenarios, we find that choices maximize predicted 
SWB (especially ―life satisfaction‖) for most people most of the time. This may partially allay 
one source of concern about using SWB data as a welfare measure. However, care must be taken 
in interpreting our findings. The amount of choice-SWB concordance we find represents an 
upper bound on the degree to which the use of SWB measures is justified as a welfare measure in 
empirical applications. Applications always require additional assumptions that we do not test. 
For example, a typical assumption is that SWB measures are comparable and can be aggregated 
across individuals.
36  
When comparing scenarios, our results suggest that, first, researchers should be 
especially cautious about using SWB data as a proxy for utility in settings that are perceived to 
involve personally-important decisions. Second, in settings where one alternative involves higher 
income or more money, predicted SWB systematically understates the utility benefits of the 
money alternative. This in turn suggests that the increasingly-common practice of estimating 
willingness to pay for more sex, less pollution, etc., by comparing the coefficient on income with 
that on another variable in multivariate SWB regressions biases these estimates upwards. 
Our scenario-based methodology could be usefully applied in several new directions. 
First, the method of assessing the correspondence between choice and predicted SWB could be 
used to assess new SWB measures. In the Web Appendix, we describe pilot data we collected on 
two such measures, neither of which appears to predict choice any better than existing measures. 
Measures that explicitly encourage integration of SWB over time, as well as ladder/mountain-
                                                 
36 Our results may also overstate the extent to which standard SWB questions provide a good measure of preferences 
because standard questions are asked absolutely (―How satisfied are with your life?‖), while our SWB questions are 
asked relatively (―Between these two options, which do you think would make you more satisfied with life?‖). 
Different individuals may apply different scales to a greater extent for an absolute measure, making it more difficult 
to translate an absolute SWB measure into a meaningful utility number than might be suggested by our results.   32 
type measures, seem especially promising areas for further research.
37   
Second, our method could be used to provide more tailored guidance for applied work by 
asking about scenarios that are intended to address specific issues of interest. For illustrative 
purposes, we pilot four such scenarios at the end of our Cornell repeat-survey. For example, to 
reconcile the intuition that Americans today are better off than in the past with the finding that 
average SWB has remained flat in the U.S. over the past decades (Easterlin, 1974, 1995; see 
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008, for a recent assessment), we ask respondents to rank being born in 
1950 versus being born in 1990 in both choice and SWB questions. Although our 209 
respondents overwhelmingly favor being born in 1990 in both questions (87 and 79 percent, 
respectively), the 9 percent who choose 1990 despite believing that they would be happier in 
1950 is statistically significantly larger than the 1 percent exhibiting the reverse response pattern 
(Liddell test p-value < 0.001). This result indeed suggests that some people prefer being born 
later even if it does not make them happier. For another example, to reconcile the intuition that 
expanding political and economic freedoms for women have made women better off with the 
finding that average SWB among women has declined in the U.S. since the 1970s, both 
absolutely and relative to men (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2009), we ask respondents to rank living 
in a world with or without these expanded freedoms for women. Again, significantly more 
respondents choose a world with these expanded freedoms for women in spite of believing that a 
world without them would make them happier than the reverse (Liddell p = 0.007). For further 
examples and full details, see the Web Appendix. 
Finally, some researchers have attempted to identify the key non-SWB aspects of life that 
are associated with greater welfare (e.g., Sen, 1985). Others have called for an SWB-based 
―national well-being index‖ to provide a measure of welfare that captures factors not represented 
in economic indicators such as GDP (e.g., Diener et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first attempt to empirically estimate the appropriate weights on SWB and other 
factors for combining them into an overall index of welfare. Our method could be applied more 
systematically for this purpose. 
 
   
                                                 
37 Since different SWB questions seem to capture distinct dimensions of well-being that correlate differently with 
income  and  other  variables  (e.g.  Kahneman  and  Deaton,  2010),  future  research  could  also  explore  whether  a 
combination of SWB questions predicts choice better than any individual SWB question alone.    33 
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Table 1: Study-specific Information 
  Study Location  Denver  CNSS          Cornell 
  Choice vs. SWB: Within- 
or Between- Subjects 
Design 
Within  Between  Within  Within       Between 
  Sample Population  Volunteers at a doctor‘s waiting room  Nationally 
representative 
          Cornell Students 
  Observations  497  569  1000  432
†        201 
  Scenarios used  1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13   1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 13  1          1-10 
      SWB Question Format 
 
Observations for each SWB question variant in parenthesis     
  (i) Life Satisfaction            
  (Isolated)  (164)  (569)       
  (ii) Happiness with Life as 
a Whole  
         
  (Isolated)  (162)    (1000)     
  (iii) Felt Happiness            
  (Isolated)  (171)         
  (iv) Own Happiness with 
Life as a Whole  
         
  Isolated        (107)       (201) 
  First/Last In Series        (107)   
  (v) Immediately Felt Own 
Happiness  
         
  Isolated        (110)   
  First/Last In Series        (108)   
  SWB Response Scale  6-point  Binary         7-point 
 
    Choice Response Scale  6-point  Binary         6-point 
 
    Meta-Choice Question?  Yes  No  No  Yes     No 
     Order variations           
  Scenario order  4-1-11-12-13-3   1-2-12-13-3-4  1           1-2- … -9-10 
    3-13-12-11-1-4  3-13-12-2-1-4
‡       
  Question order  Choice-Meta-SWB 
SWB-Choice-Meta 
  SWB-Choice  Choice-SWB   
  Aspects of life order 
 
           Two opposite orderings of 11        
       non-SWB aspects 
  Summary: number of 
questionnaire versions 
12  4  1  8  4 
 
Notes: See section I for details and for the framing of the choice, SWB, and meta-choice questions; see the Appendix for the list of scenarios (1-13).  
†  Of these, 230 were surveyed twice, allowing us to conduct measurement-error-corrected estimation. 
‡ Scenario 4 is always presented last because it is followed by both a choice and a SWB question. In order to have a clean between-subjects design, 
we did not want subjects to know we were interested in both choice and SWB until after subjects were done with the rest of the scenarios. We also 
note that this scenario is presented in four different order-versions, so strictly speaking the Denver between-subjects study includes the four 
questionnaire versions reported in the table’s bottom row, times four (sixteen versions in total). We report the number four because in terms of the 
between-subjects part of this study, there are four versions. Table 2: Choice and SWB Responses Across Studies and Scenarios (continued on next page) 
    Denver Study  CNSS 
 
Choice Scenario 
1  2  3  4  11  12  13  1 
  Sleep  Concert  Abs. Inc.  Legacy  Concert  Low Rent  Friends  Sleep 
  For exact phrasing  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs 
  
see Appendix  Income  Birthday  Rel. Inc.  Income  Duty  Short 
Commute 








Higher SWB: Option 1 
58%     48%  24%  16%  52%  50%  74% 
Chosen: Option 1 
Higher SWB: Option 2  29%    42%  60%  65%  32%  34%  18%  Chosen: Option 2 
Higher SWB: Option 2  1%    6%  2%  12%  11%  2%  1%  Chosen: Option 1 
Higher SWB: Option 1  12%    4%  14%  7%  5%  14%  7%  Chosen: Option 2 
                 
p-value from Liddell Exact Test   0.000 
 
0.350  0.000  0.024  0.002  0.000  0.000 
  n = 425  n = 420  n = 422  n = 422  n = 425  n = 422  n = 972 
                 
Average p-value from 500 repetitions of 
Fisher Exact Test treating within-subject 
data as if they were between-subjects 
0.111    0.527  0.044  0.359  0.315  0.071   









         Version 2    Version 2      
Higher SWB: Option 2  34%  86%  51%  ***    54%  54%    
Chosen: Option 2  44%  84%  48%  ***    55%  53%    
                 
p-value of Fisher Test  0.020  0.716  0.433 
***   
0.930  0.793    
n = 525  n = 524  n = 525  n = 526  n = 525    
Notes: Response distribution by study and scenario. For the complete text of each scenario, see the Appendix. If a scenario‘s phrasing changed meaningfully between surveys, the version of the scenario is indicated in the first 
row of the study block. For between-subjects data, we report the Fisher Exact Test p-value testing the null hypothesis that mean response to choice question = mean response to SWB question (an unpaired equality-of-
proportions test). For within-subject data, we report the analogous Liddell Exact Test p-value (a paired equality-of-proportions test). In cases where respondents could indicate SWB indifference, responses indicating 
indifference were dropped from these tests. To conduct hypothesis tests with equal power for the within- and between-subjects data, we treat the within-subject data as if they were between-subjects by randomly assigning 
half of the observations to choice and half to SWB, and only looking at each respondent‘s assigned response. The reported p-value and n are the average across 500 repetitions of this algorithm. See details in section II. Since 
Scenario 4 ( ―legacy vs income‖) was not presented in a between-subjects design in spite of being included in the between-subjects part of the Denver study, its results from that part are not reported. For a description of this 






Table 2: Choice and SWB Responses Across Studies and Scenarios (continued from previous page) 
 
    Cornell Study 
 
Choice Scenario  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
  Sleep  Concert  Abs. Inc.  Legacy  Apple  Money  Socialize  Family  Education  Interest 
  For exact phrasing,  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs 
  
see Appendix  Income  Birthday  Rel. Inc.  Income  Orange  Time  Sleep  Money  Social life  Career 
    








Higher SWB: Option 1  29%  29%  41%  44%  45%  44%  62%  68%  53%  27%  Chosen: Option 1 
Higher SWB: Option 2  46%  49%  43%  31%  50%  37%  15%  15%  22%  35% 
Chosen: Option 2 
Higher SWB: Option 2  1%  7%  14%  8%  2%  14%  17%  5%  22%  3% 
Chosen: Option 1 
Higher SWB: Option 1  23%  15%  2%  17%  3%  5%  6%  12%  3%  35% 
Chosen: Option 2 
                     
Indifference for SWB  8%  14%  13%  10%  37%  22%  10%  5%  6%  6% 
                     
p-value of Liddell Exact Test   0.000  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.424  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  n = 397  n = 368  n = 375  n = 387  n = 270  n = 333  n = 385  n = 409  n = 402  n = 402 
                     
Average p-value from 500 
repetitions of Fisher Exact 
Test. 
0.025  0.387  0.234  0.348  0.531  0.333  0.184  0.377  0.035  0.002 









         Version 2             
Higher SWB: Option 2  46%  67%  49%  38%  56%  34%  26%  14%  16%  61% 
Chosen: Option 2  66%  71%  40%  38%  51%  34%  18%  26%  29%  50% 
                     
p-value of Fisher Test  0.006  0.643  0.195  1.000  0.537  1.000  0.234  0.048  0.027  0.117 
n = 197  n = 196  n = 193  n = 196  n = 168  n = 194  n = 198  n = 198  n = 198  n = 198 
Notes: Response distribution by study and scenario. For the complete text of each scenario, see the Appendix. If a questions phrasing changed meaningfully between surveys, the version of the 
question is indicated in the first row of the study block. For between-subjects data, we report the Fisher Exact Test p-value testing the null-hypothesis that mean response to choice question = mean 
response to SWB question (an unpaired equality-of-proportions test). For within-subject data, we report the analogous Liddell Exact Test p-value (a paired equality-of-proportions test). In cases where 
respondents could indicate SWB indifference, responses indicating indifference were dropped from these tests. To conduct hypothesis tests with equal power for the within- and between-subjects data, 
we treat the within-subject data as if they were between-subject by randomly assigning observations to choice or to SWB in numbers that match the between-subjects test, and only looking at each 
respondent‘s assigned response. The reported p-value and n are the average across 500 repetitions of this algorithm. See details in section II. 39 
Table 3: Regressions of Choice on Aspects of Life  
 
  OLS  Ordered 
Probit 
Probit 
        SIMEX 
Corrected 
    SIMEX 
Corrected 
Measurement error correction  None  None  None  Additive  None  None  Additive 
Own happiness  0.54






  (0.009)    (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.019) 
               







    (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.032) 
               
Health    0.07
**  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02 
    (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.042) 
               
Life's level of romance    -0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.00  0.04 
    (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.045) 
               
Social life    -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04 
    (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.028)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.036) 
               







    (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.028) 
               
Life's level of spirituality    -0.08
**  -0.02  -0.04  -0.02  -0.04  -0.05 
    (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.047) 
               
Life's level of fun    0.13
***  0.05
*  0.03  0.04
*  0.04
*  0.03 
    (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.036) 
               







    (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.027) 
               
Life's non-boringness    0.07
***  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 
    (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.037) 
               
Physical comfort    0.09
***  0.04
**  0.03  0.04
**  0.05
**  0.04 
    (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.030) 
               







    (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.025) 
Observations  6285  6220  6217  6217  6217  6217  6217 
(pseudo) R
2  0.38  0.21  0.41    0.19  0.35   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. In the OLS and ordered probit regressions, the dependent variable is 6-point choice. In the probit regressions the dependent variable is binary choice. All 
regressions use 7-point ratings of aspects. Based on 633 Cornell respondents. Each observation is a respondent's ratings for one scenario; there are 10 observations per respondent corresponding to the 
10 scenarios in the questionnaires. Probit and ordered probit regressions include (unreported) scenario fixed effects. OLS regressions’ variables are demeaned at the scenario level, generating 
coefficients equivalent to including scenario fixed effects. Measurement error corrections are done using the simulation extrapolation method described in section III, under the assumption of additive 
measurement error. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 40 





1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
  Sleep  Concert  Abs. Inc.  Legacy  Apple  Money  Socialize  Family  Education  Interest 
For exact phrasing,  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs  vs 
see Appendix  Income  Birthday  Rel. Inc.  Income  Orange  Time  Sleep  Money  Social life  Career 












  (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.030) 
                       
Family happiness  0.08
***  0.07
*  0.01  0.16
***  0.05  0.16  0.15
*  -0.09  0.05  0.14
***  0.21
*** 
  (0.015)  (0.032)  (0.071)  (0.046)  (0.041)  (0.159)  (0.059)  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.037)  (0.041) 
                       
Health  0.00  -0.05  -0.07  -0.11  -0.04  0.05  0.06  0.18
***  0.05  -0.03  -0.06 
  (0.019)  (0.055)  (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.058)  (0.065)  (0.075)  (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.044)  (0.063) 
                       
Life's level of romance  -0.01  0.08  -0.02  0.07  -0.00  -0.67
**  -0.10  0.02  -0.03  0.01  0.01 
  (0.021)  (0.059)  (0.064)  (0.078)  (0.066)  (0.228)  (0.086)  (0.054)  (0.068)  (0.053)  (0.072) 
                       
Social life  -0.03  -0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.02  0.04  -0.00  -0.05  -0.04  0.01 
  (0.018)  (0.055)  (0.043)  (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.225)  (0.071)  (0.065)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.054) 
                       
Control over your life  0.08
***  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.08
*  -0.00  0.07  0.15
***  0.05  0.06  0.07
* 
  (0.015)  (0.042)  (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.039)  (0.093)  (0.052)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.038)  (0.035) 
                       
Life's level of spirituality  -0.02  -0.04  -0.00  -0.16  0.13
*  0.31  -0.15  -0.01  -0.15
*  -0.00  -0.01 
  (0.021)  (0.049)  (0.061)  (0.090)  (0.055)  (0.221)  (0.091)  (0.076)  (0.062)  (0.054)  (0.068) 
                       
Life's level of fun  0.05
*  0.06  0.15
**  0.04  0.05  -0.08  0.13  -0.03  0.03  0.06  -0.00 
  (0.018)  (0.042)  (0.051)  (0.066)  (0.047)  (0.127)  (0.068)  (0.073)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
                       
Social status  0.06
***  -0.00  0.04  0.05  0.04  -0.27  -0.01  0.06  0.11  0.06
*  0.16
*** 
  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.045)  (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.227)  (0.061)  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.029)  (0.043) 
                       
Life's non-boringness  -0.01  0.05  -0.03  0.22
**  -0.01  0.09  -0.03  0.18
**  -0.05  -0.02  0.05 
  (0.017)  (0.037)  (0.054)  (0.078)  (0.047)  (0.121)  (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
                       
Physical comfort  0.04
**  0.09
*  0.00  -0.05  0.00  0.21
**  -0.00  0.05  -0.10
*  0.06  -0.02 
  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.060)  (0.054)  (0.042)  (0.066)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.049) 
                       










  (0.013)  (0.038)  (0.047)  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.119)  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.037)  (0.029) 
Observations  6217  615  621  620  624  624  619  622  625  626  621 
R
2  0.41  0.46  0.43  0.53  0.41  0.58  0.42  0.32  0.38  0.43  0.37 
Incremental R
2  0.03  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.07  0.02  0.08  0.13 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions of 6-point choice on 7-point aspects of life. Based on 633 Cornell respondents. The leftmost column aggregates data across choice scenarios; 
each of the other columns corresponds to a specific scenario. Each observation is a respondent’s ratings for one scenario; there are 10 observations per respondent corresponding to the 10 scenarios in 
the questionnaires. All variables are demeaned at the scenario level, generating coefficients equivalent to including scenario fixed effects. ―Incremental R
2‖ is the difference in R
2 between the reported 
multivariate regression and a univariate regression of choice on happiness; it represents the increased percentage of variation in choice that can be explained by including the additional aspects. 
 * p < 
0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.00141 
Figure 1: Raw Response Distributions (Choice and Aspects of Life) 
 
 
Notes: Based on 633 Cornell respondents. See details in text. The histograms show the distribution of 6-point responses to the choice question (top row) and 7-point responses to the aspect questions 







































































































































































































Appendix: Scenarios Presented in Surveys 
 
Scenario 1: Sleep vs. Income 
Say you have to decide between two new jobs. The jobs are exactly the same in almost every 
way, but have different work hours and pay different amounts. 
 
Option 1: A job paying $80,000 per year. The hours for this job are reasonable, and you would 
be able to get about 7.5 hours of sleep on the average work night. 
 
Option 2: A job paying $140,000 per year. However, this job requires you to go to work at 
unusual hours, and you would only be able to sleep around 6 hours on the average work night. 
 
Scenario 2: Concert vs. Birthday 
Suppose you promised a close friend that you would attend his or her 50th [―21st‖ in student 
samples] birthday dinner. However, at the last minute you find out that you have won front row 
seats to see your favorite musician, and the concert is at the same time as the dinner. This is the 
musician’s last night in town. You face two options: 
 
Option 1: Skip your friend’s birthday dinner to attend the concert. 
 
Option 2: Attend your friend’s birthday dinner and miss the concert. 
 
 
Scenario 3: Absolute Income vs. Relative Income 
Suppose you are considering a new job, and have offers from two companies. Even though all 
aspects of the two jobs are identical, employees’ salaries are different across the two companies 
due to arbitrary timing of when salary benchmarks happened to be set. Everyone in each 
company knows the other employees’ salaries. You must choose one of the two companies, 
which means you must decide between the following two options:  
 
Option 1: Your yearly income is $105,000, while on average others at your level earn $120,000. 43 
 
Option 2: Your yearly income is $100,000, while on average others at your level earn $85,000. 
 
Scenario 4: Legacy vs. Income 
 (Phrasing in Denver within-subject study): Suppose you are a skilled artist, and you have to 
decide between two career paths for your life.  
 
Option 1: You devote yourself to your own style of painting. This would require a number of 
sacrifices, such as having less time for friends and family, and making less money. For example, 
you expect that selling your paintings will give you an income of $40,000 a year. If you choose 
this path, you don’t expect that your work will be appreciated in your lifetime, but posthumously 
you will make an impact on the history of art, achieve fame, and be remembered in your work. 
 
Option 2: You become a graphic designer at an advertising company. This would give you more 
money and more time with friends and family than Option 1. The company is offering you a 
salary of $60,000 a year, which will afford you a much more comfortable lifestyle, but you will 
have no impact and leave no legacy to be remembered. 
   
 (Phrasing in Denver between-subject study and Cornell study) : Suppose you are a skilled artist, 
and you have to decide between two career paths for your life. There are two styles of painting 
that you consider to be your own style, and you enjoy both equally. Style 1 happens to be much 
less popular than Style 2 today, but you know it will be an important style in the future. 
 
Option 1: You devote yourself to Style 1. You expect that selling your paintings will give you 
an income of $40,000 a year. If you choose this path, you don’t expect that your work will be 
appreciated in your lifetime, but posthumously you will make an impact on the history of art, 
achieve fame, and be remembered in your work. 
 
Option 2: You devote yourself to Style 2. You expect that selling your paintings will give you 
an income of $60,000 a year, but you will have no memorable impact. [In the Denver between-
subject study, each subject saw this question three times, with different salaries in option 2. This 44 
number took a value of either $42,000, $60,000, $80,000, or $100,000.] 
 
Scenario 5: Apple vs. Orange 
Suppose you are checking out a new supermarket that just opened near where you live. As you 
walk by the fresh fruit display, you are offered your choice of a free snack: 
 
Option 1: A freshly sliced apple. 
 
Option 2: A freshly sliced orange. 
 
Scenario 6: Money vs. Time 
Suppose that due to budget cuts, the school implements a ―student activities fee‖ of $15 dollars a 
week to help pay for maintenance of facilities used for extracurricular student activities. 
However, the school allows you to not pay the fee if instead you put in 2 hours of service a week 
shelving books at the library. You face two options: 
 
Option 1: Spend 2 hours a week shelving books. 
 
Option 2: Pay $15 a week. 
Scenario 7: Socialize vs. Sleep 
Say you are hanging out with a group of friends at your friend’s room. You are having a really 
good time, but it is getting to be late at night. You have to decide between two options. 
Option 1: Stay up another hour. It is likely you will feel tired all day tomorrow, but this 
particular evening you are having an especially fun time. 
Option 2: Excuse yourself from the group, and go to bed. You will be disappointed to miss the 
fun, but you know you will feel better the next day and be more productive at paying attention in 
class and doing your homework.  
Scenario 8: Family vs. Money 45 
Imagine that for the first time in three years, your parents (or if your parents are gone, your 
closest relatives who are older than you) have arranged for a special family gathering that will 
happen the day after Thanksgiving, with everyone also invited to Thanksgiving dinner.  You face 
two options. Would you choose to go to the family gathering the day after Thanksgiving (and 
maybe to Thanksgiving dinner) if getting there required a $500 roundtrip plane ticket for plane 
flights that were 5 hours each way?  
Option 1: Go to the thanksgiving gathering, which requires a $500 round trip plane ticket. 
Option 2: Miss the thanksgiving gathering, but save the money. 
Scenario 9: Education vs. Social Life 
Suppose you have decided to leave Cornell, and are transferring to a new school. You have been 
accepted to two schools, and are deciding where to go. The first school is extremely selective and 
high quality, but is in a small town out in the country with a less active social scene. The second 
school is in a major city with a great social scene, but is slightly less renowned.  Which would 
you choose?  
Option 1: Highly selective school, isolated socially and geographically. 
Option 2: Less selective school, socially active and in a major city. 
Scenario 10: Interest vs. Career 
Suppose you are considering two summer internships. One is extremely interesting and involves 
work you are passionate about, but does not advance your career. The other will likely be boring, 
but will help you get a job in the future. Which would you choose? 
Option 1: Interesting internship which does not advance career. 
Option 2: Boring internship which will help you get a job. 
Scenario 11: Concert vs. Duty 
Say you are driving by yourself to see your favorite musician in concert on their last day in town. 46 
You are five minutes away, and the concert starts in ten minutes. On the drive, you witness a 
truck hit a parked car, causing roughly $500 in damages, and then drive away without leaving 
their information. You notice the truck’s license plate, and you are the only witness. You face 
two options:  
 
Option 1: Keep driving and get to the concert on time. 
 
Option 2: Call the police, in which case you will have to wait around the parked car to give a 
testimony. This would take about half an hour. You would have trouble finding a seat and might 
miss the whole concert. 
 
 Scenario 12: Low Rent vs. Short Commute 
 (Phrasing in Denver within-subject study): Say you are moving to a new town. You are trying to 
decide between two similar apartments which you could rent. The two apartments are identical in 
almost everything – including floor plan, amenities, neighborhood character, schools, safety, etc. 
However, they have different rents and are located at different distances from your work. 
 
Option 1: An apartment which requires a 45-minute drive to work.  The rent is about 20% of 
your monthly income. 
 
Option 2:  A similar apartment, with only a 10-minute drive. The rent is about 40% of your 
monthly income. 
 
(Phrasing in Denver between-subject study):  Say you are moving to a new town. The new town 
is known for its terrible traffic jams, and driving there is widely considered to be unpleasant. You 
are trying to decide between two similar apartments which you could rent. The two apartments 
are identical in almost everything – including floor plan, amenities, neighborhood character, 
schools, safety, etc. However, they have different rents and are located at different distances 
from your work. 
 
Option 1: An apartment which requires a 45-minute drive each way to work. The commute has 47 
heavy traffic almost the whole way.  The rent is about 20% of your monthly income. 
 
Option 2:  A similar apartment which requires a 10-minute drive each way to work. The 
commute has heavy traffic almost the whole way.   The rent is about 40% of your monthly 
income. 
 
Scenario 13: Friends vs Income 
Say you have been reassigned at your job, and will be moved to a new location. There are two 
offices where you could request to work. One office is in a city where many of your friends 
happen to live, and pays 20% less than your current salary. The other office is in a city where 
you don’t know anyone, and pays 10% more than your current salary. Your job will be exactly 
the same at either office. You must decide between the following two options: 
 
Option 1: Make 20% less than your current salary and move to the city with your friends. 
 
Option 2: Make 10% more than your current salary and move to a city where you do not know 
anyone. 
 
 
 